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Abstract
In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices
for the same good. Earlier research has explained this phenomenon by demon-
strating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make
use of costly search to discover prices. Taking as a starting point the model
of Burdett and Judd (Econometric, 1983), this paper, extending evolutionary
techniques to a game with nonlinear payoffs and a continuum of strategies, re-
examines the question of price dispersion from an evolutionary, disequilibrium
perspective. That is, firms and consumers adjust behaviour  adaptively in re-
sponse to current market conditions. We find that dispersed price equilibria
are unstable when consumers use a fixed sample size search rule but may be
stable when a reservation price rule is used.
Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C72, D83.
Keywords: Learning, Evolution, Search, Price Dispersion.
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1 Introduction
It is a common experience to find that prices vary between different sellers, giving
consumers an incentive to search for low prices. Stigler  (1961) introduced the notion
of modelling consumer search as repeated random draws from the current distribution
of prices. In response Rothschild (1973) set up a challenge. He argued that it was
not enough to examine, as had Stigler,  the search behaviour of consumers faced with
an exogenous distribution of prices. Sellers, presumably, would only charge prices
different from those of their competitors if they could make a profit by doing so. To
explain price dispersion, economists must show that such price-setting behaviour was
a rational response by traders to the search behaviour of consumers, and vice-versa.
In game-theoretic terms, it was necessary to find a Nash equilibrium, where each firm
and consumer adopted a strategy that was a best reply to the play of all other firms
and consumers.
In fact, Diamond (1971) had introduced a model which satisfied Rothschild’s con-
ditions. However, the model’s main result is usually viewed as a paradox. Diamond
was able to show that for any positive search costs, in equilibrium, no consumer
would search, and all firms would charge the price that maximised joint-profits. This
is clearly a Nash equilibrium: when prices are identical, there is no incentive to search;
when there is no search, there is no incentive to cut prices to increase sales. Note
that the converse state where all consumers are fully-informed and all firms charge a
competitive price cannot be a Nash equilibrium. For positive search costs and with all
prices identical, active search is not optimal. Since consumers are not fully informed,
firms can raise prices without losing all customers.
on the “Law of One Price” might have expected price dispersion to be fragile it was
surprising that the collapse was in this direction,
Faced with this challenge, subsequent authors, (a partial list includes Salop  and
Stiglitz, 1977, 1982; Wilde and Schwartz, 1979; Varian,  19S0; Burdett and Judd,
1983; Rob, 1985; Bester,  19S8; Wilde, 1992; Benabou,  1993), produced models with
dispersed price equilibria. However, there remains an unresolved problem with this
earlier literature, that of multiple equilibria. There may be more than one equilibrium
at which prices are dispersed, and typically, the joint-profit maximizing outcome
found by Diamond remains a Nash equilibrium even in the presence of these others.1
Selecting between these equilibria is not straightforward. It is easily verified that
for strictly positive search costs the joint-profit maximizing outcome is a strict  Nash
equilibrium. That is, any deviation leads to strictly lower payoffs. It cannot therefore
be easily dismissed.2
The other striking difference about the model of Diamond (1971) is that it is “A
Model of Price Adjustment” not of equilibrium. There are several advantages to such
lThi5 problem  occurs in many different models. See Wilde (1992).
2For a formal definition of strictness and its place in the heirarchy  of equilibrium refinements, s
for example van Damme  (1991).
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a disequilibrium approach. First, it answers the question of how an economy arrives
at equilibrium and why one equilibrium is chosen over another. Second, it allows a
different approach to the modelling of consumer search. Some models assume as did
Stigler that consumers use a fixed sample size search rule,  that is, the consumer’s
problem is to choose a sample size n. The consumer then collects n prices and
then takes the lowest offer. More popular has been the assumption of sequential
search, that is, after each price quotation the consumer must decide whether to buy
at that price or to obtain a further quotation. However, in both cases the cornrnon if
implausible assumption is that the consumer knows the distribution of prices before
starting searching. Here, just as did Diamond (1971), we can relax this assumption.
Consumers do not have to know the distribution of prices in order to determine the
optimum level of search effort; it can be learnt from experience or from the experience
of other consumers.
h’lore recently, disequilibrium models have been back in fashion under the title of
learning and evolution. While this work has up to now mostly been on a very abstract
level, there may now be enough theoretical ammunition to analyse  the problem of
price dispersion. Here we present an dynamic, evolutionary model which is able to
select between the multiple equilibria present in these models. Evolutionary models
are not new to economics but have not always been well received by economists. In
particular, the assumption of evolutionary game theory that agents use a single fixed
strategy which determines their rate of reproduction may seem ill-suited to economic
applications. However, the translation of models between disciplines is not intended
to be over-literal. In human society, the births and deaths are of ideas and strategies,
not people. We can assume that at each point in time a population of individuals have
to choose between different strategies. The state of the system can be summarised by
the proportions of the population playing each strategy. The system changes state as
agents  change strategies. In fact, in an earlier paper (Hopkins, 1995) it was shown
that if one aggregates such learning behaviour across a population, the resulting
aggregate dynamic is qualitatively similar to the evolutionary replicator dynamics.3
The exact dynamics do not have to be specified, rather it is possible, as shown by
for example, Nachbar (1990), Friedman (1991), Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), to work with wide classes of dynamics, which
share certain qualitative properties. While this might not represent the behaviour  of
perfectly rational agents, it encompasses a wide range of plausible adaptive processes
and learning schemes, including some quite sophisticated behaviour.
A further criticism might be that much of the recent work in evolutionary games
has been in the context of two-player normal-form games, a context that does not
encompass most economic problems. Indeed, the game here is an asymmetric game
with many players. These are divided in two distinct groups, buyers and sellers.
The payoff of each player depends upon the actions of all other players. The payoffs
are not linear. Firms can choose from a continuum of prices. It is a situation very
far from that of a normal-form game. Nonetheless, it is possible to apply the same
evolutionary techniques.
Up to now, evolutionary and learning models have been applied to similar prob-
lems by using a discrete approximation of a continuous strategy space (for example,
Roth and Erev, 1995).  This may be a problem in that, for the many models of dis-
persed price equilibria, the existence and character of equilibrium depends on the
properties of the continuum. Hence we develop learning dynamics on the Hilbert
space L2, where we look at the evolution of the functions describing the distribution
of prices. While this does involve some technical difficulties, we are able to show that
even when firms can choose from a continuum of prices, it is possible to obtain clear
results on the stability of dispersed price equilibria under different assumptions. In
particular, we analyse  the model of Burdett and Judd (1983), which has the advan-
tage of including differing formulations of consumer search behaviour as special cases.
We find that when consumers use a fixed sample size rule dispersed price equilibria
are unstable, but when a reservation price rule is used, there exist stable dispersed
price equilibria.
In this section we outline the nature of equilibrium in the two different models consid-
ered by Burdett and Judd (1983). Obviously full details can be found in the original
paper. Burdett and Judd demonstrate how a dispersed price equilibrium can arise
without any heterogeneity either amongst firms or consumers. We are concerned with
a market for a homogeneous good. For example, the same model of car or computer
from a particular manufacturer is often sold by many different outlets, often at differ-
ent prices. Consumers buy this product only infrequently. The sellers we can think
of as a continuum of identical small shops, which buy the good from a wholesaler
for a constant cost, which here we assume to be zero. We assume (an average of)
p customers per seller. Firms choose prices in order to maximise profits. There is
an upper bound on prices p*, which can be seen as the profit-maximising  price in a
monopoly situation. A continuum of consumers are uninformed about which firms
charge which prices. They must engage in costly non systematic search in order to
obtain price quotations.
We consider two cases, first, where consumers use a fixed sample size rule, and
second, where search is sequential. In the first case, the consumer must decide how
many quotations to obtain at a constant cost c (the convention is that the first
quotation is free). Only once all the n price quotations have arrived can the consumer
purchase from the firm that offers the lowest price. Such nonsequential search can
be optimal (Morgan and Manning, 1985), and fits the case where a consumer must
write away for quotations, or where a number of quotations can be obtained by
buying a magazine or newspaper. Sequential search is where a consumer obtains me
3
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quotation and then decides whether to take another. The classic result is that when
the distribution of prices is known, optimal sequential search takes the form of a
reservation price rule. That is, the consumer decides on a target price and continues
to search until it is found.
What is common to both forms of search is the possibility of ex post heterogeneity
of information. That is, while starting out with identical information, some consumers
will find a better price than others. This is of course what allows the existence of a
dispersed price equilibrium. In particular, a proportion ql of consumers know of one
price,  ~z have two price  quotations and so on. This can arise because either consumers
use a fixed sample size rule or if consumers search sequentially, but the search is noisy,
for each search made there is a probability qk of finding k quotations simultaneously.
If the distribution of prices is given by the cumulative distribution function F(p), the
probability for consumers that a given price p is the lowest that they find with two
quotations is 2(1– F(p)), after three 3(1 – F(p))2.  We continue to assume that there
is a continuum of sellers with constant zero marginal cost. Hence, profits for firms
are then ccl
(1)
k=l
where p is the average measure of consumers per firm. Burdet  t and Judd show that
the only possible distribution of prices in equilibrium must have continuous support
on the interval (P,  p*), where p is to be determined endogenously. If there were a—
gap in the distribution on some interval (~i,~j),  a firm charging pi could raise its
price to fill the gap without losing any customers. If there were a mass point in the
distribution at some price pi, a firm could cut its price  from pi by an arbitrarily small
amount and gain a discrete jump in sales,
In fact, Burdett  and Judd show that when consumers use a fixed sample size search
rule, a dispersed price equilibrium is only possible when a proportion 1 > ql > 0 of
consumers buy one quotation, and all others q2 = 1 – ql obtain two. In equilibrium,
the profit for all firms must be equal. Given (l), and
T(f)”)  = p“pql = pp [ql + 2q2] = T(pJ,
we can solve for both p and F(p). Denoting the equilibrium cumulative distribution
function by 0, we hav~
p > p*
(2)
and
4
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Is this
difference
consumer
an equilibrium for consumers? If the price distribution is given by @, the
between the expected price paid by a consumer who searches once and a
who searches twice is given by
V(ql)  =/p d@(p) -z/P(l-  @(P)) WP).
This is a continuous function of ql with a unique maximum on (O, 1). That is, if c
is less than the maximum, there are two values of ql such that V(ql)  = c, that is,
such that consumers are indifferent between their two strategies. If c is higher than
the maximum, so that search is not worthwhile, no dispersed price equilibrium exists.
Burdett and Judd note however, that another equilibrium exists (irrespective of the
value of c). It is the same outcome that Diamond (1971) found. That is, the state
with ql = 1 and, for all firms, p = p*. This is in fact the limiting case of (2) when
ql + 1. However, V(ql)  + —w as ql ~ 1, so that consumer indifference certainly
cannot be maintained in this limit.
Diamond’s result suggests that a sequential search rule is not conducive to price
dispersion. In general terms, given a uniform cost to each search, a population of
rational, maximizing consumers will all settle on the same reservation price and will
not buy for more. However, as Burdett  and Judd show, such an outcome is not
incompatible with price dispersion if search is ‘(noisy”. That is, at each search, a
consumer has a possibility of seeing more than one price, the number observed being
determined by some exogenous probability distribution. In particular, the probability
that k prices are observed is qk. Now, if consumers share a common search cost c, and
hence share a single reservation price ~, no seller will choose a price p > ~. However,
the profits for each seller charging a price which is acceptable to consumers, are given
by (l), just as in the non-sequential case. However, here the distribution of the qk is
exogenous, and does not arise out of consumer choice. Importantly, this leaves open
the possibility that qk > 0 for some k >2. Burdett  and Judd demonstrate that for
c > 0, and O < ql < 1, the unique equilibrium is a dispersed price equilibrium. That
is, there is a continuous distribution of prices on some interval ~, ~].
We can illustrate how using an evolutionary dynamic might help to select between
equilibria in these models by looking at the very simple example where sellers have
a choice between only two prices {p, p*}. This is not intended to be realistic but the
same intuition drives the result in t~is case as when seller choose from a continuum of
prices. We first assume that consumers search with a fixed sample size rule, and again
for sake of simplicity, we assume that they must choose between sampling one and
sampling two prices. Their expected costs, if a proportion x of the sellers charge p and
l–x charge p”, will be x2+(1 –x)p” in the first case andC+(Z2+2Z(1–z))p+(l –~)2p*
in the second. If ql consumers choose the first option, and q2 = 1 — ql the second,
then sellers’ profits are respectively
7r(~ = pp[q~ + q2(2 – z)], or, fi(p”) = p“p[ql + q2(l – ~)]. (3)
5
.7r(pj = 7r(p*)
/
1,1)
(0 o))
Figure 1: A simple example
If search costs are not too high, then we have the structure of equilibrium illustrated
in Figure 1. There are two values of x, {z, Z} for which consumers are indifferent
between searching once and searching twice. The variance of prices, and hence the
expected return to search, is at a maximum at z = 0.5. At x = 1 or 0, searching once
dominates searching twice. The curve maps the equal profit line between the sellers’
two possible strategies. It is upward sloping because as q rises the profits of firms
charging p* rises. In other words,
d7r(p)/dx – dz(p”)fdx  < 0 . (4)—
Profits can only be kept equal if the number of low-priced firms z increases, which
reduces the number of customers at the high-priced firms.
There are two interior equilibria, and one at the bottom right hand corner (the
no-search outcome). The arrows are generated by the simple assumption that the
proportion of the population playing the strategy which is earning a higher payoff
will grow at the expense of the other. For example, near the no-search equilibrium,
searching once is more profitable than searching twice, and p“ more profitable than p.
Hence the arrows point right and down. Both the interior equilibria will be unstabye
under any such simple dynamic. This is simply because the equal profit curve
upward-sloping. Looking at (3), it is clear that the profits of the firms charging
are increasing in their population share 1 — x. There is a positive externality
6
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between these sellers in that the more of them that there are, the less the probability
of consumers finding a better price. Hence, a deviation from equilibrium which, for
example, increases the market share of the high-priced firms, (a shift downwards in
the Figure), increases their profits. Furthermore, because of the condition (4) their
profits increase more than the profits of the low-priced firms, leading to a deviation
of increased size.
How would this model change if some consumers took more than two price quo-
tations, which might happen in the noisy sequential search model? Certainly, we can
no longer represent the situation graphically as in Figure 1, however, the externality
would still be there. A decrease in x would still raise profits of both low-priced and
high-priced sellers. Nonetheless, it is possible that d~(~)/dx – dx(p*)/dx < (). That
is, the biggest rise in profits would go to the low-priced sellers. Hence, in contrast to
the previous case, stability is possible.
This is of course a very simple analysis and hence possibly misleading. It might
be argued, for example, that the instability in the case of a fixed sample size rule
arises solely from the inadequate nature of the discrete approximation of a continuous
strategy space. The positive externality shared between the highest-priced firms
depends on the existence of positive mass of firms charging that price, something
that may not occur when the strategy space is a continuum. For that reason we will
examine the dynamics when sellers can choose from a continuum of prices. We find
that it is still the case that the dispersed price equilibrium is unstable. However,
the first step is to discuss the exact structure of dispersed price equilibrium in such
circumstances.
Having described some possible equilibria, we now deal with disequilibrium. We
imagine the above one-shot game is repeated many times. That is, at each point
in time firms must choose prices and consumers a search strategy, for example, how
many price quotations to buy or a reservation price to search for. As is common in the
literature on learning and evolution, agents do not play some complex intertemporal
equilibrium. Instead they adjust their play of the stage game. In this context, firms
change prices in the direction of increasing profits. This is not unreasonable in the
context of the model. Firms are assumed ‘tsmall”  relative to the size of the market and
have little strategic power. Consumers participate in this market only infrequently.
This also means that firms have little incentive to build a reputation.
The parameter p now represents the volume of the flow of consumers on to the
market. This rate is fixed and exogenous .A We do not assume that consumers know
4Fer~htman  and Fi~hman (1992)  con5ider  the case where rational forward-looking  consumers maY
decide to defer consumption if they expect prices to fall.
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the distribution of prices. Instead we assume a type of social learning of the type for
example set out in Young (1993). That is, consumers have some access to informa-
tion on how consumers have behaved in the past and how successful were the different
strategies pursued. They obtain this information either from their own past experi-
ence of the market or from advice from more recent participants. Thus consumers act
adaptively using past observations to form an estimate of the current distribution of
prices. But there also needs to be some rule by which they decide on what response
they make. One alternative would be for consumers to choose a search strategy which
was a best response to the estimated distribution. This would be consistent with the
idea of fictitious play perhaps the most popular learning model in the recent liter-
ature, (see for example, Milgrom and Roberts, 1991; Young, 1993; Fudenberg  and
Kreps,  1993).
However, there are other models of learning. It is possible to use the evolutionary
replicator dynamics or their generalisations as a way of modelling human learning
behaviour,  for example, Friedman (1991), while another alternative is the learning
model considered by Roth and Erev  (1995), or the learning by imitation model of
Schlag (1994). In an earlier paper (Hopkins, 1995), one of us demonstrated that the
aggregation across a population of players of all these learning rules were qualitatively
similar. For example, evolutionarily  stable strategies (a definition follows) are asymp-
totically stable for all dynamics of this class. It is possible therefore to work with
the class of positive definite dynamics which include all these models as special cases.
Within this framework, firms and consumers could have different learning rules, or
behaviour could vary within the two populations; for example, some agents could
play mixed strategies, some could play pure.
Much of the \vork on learning and evolution has been in the context of a large
population of agents who are randomly matched to play a normal form game. Unfor-
tunately this does not match a description of most markets, at least as traditionally
modelled by economists. First, agents interact not by random matching but through
the price mechanism. For example, in Cournot type competition, rather than being
matched one-to-one, firms interact through the effect their decisions on output have
on aggregate output and hence on price. Second, profits are non-linear in the firm’s
decision variable. Lastly, the strategy space is a continuum.
The first difficulty is easily overcome. Even in a random matching environment
the aggregate is important because it determines each agent’s expected payoffs. h
the case of a symmetric normal form game with n strategies, let A be the n x n
payoff matrix, and let each agent play a strategy (possibly mixed) y c S. = {y =
(J119 “” “j !/n ) c Rn : Zy, = l,y, z O for ~ = 1,...,  n}. If mixed strategies in the
population are described by a distribution function F’ on S’n, then let z E S. =
J y dF’ be the vector of the average propensity in the population to play each strategy
(If all agents play a pure strategy, then x is simply the vector of proportions of
the population following each strategy). Then, an individual playing the strategy y
against a population with current state x, has expected payoff y “ Az.
s
A positive definite dynamic is a dynamic which has the form,
~ = Q(x) Ax. (5)
where Q is a symmetric semi-positive definite matrix. There are certain other condi-
tions which are set out in Hopkins (1995). Similar conditions with modifications to
allow for an infinite number of strategies appear in Section 4 of this paper. However,
the most significant condition is simply that of positive definiteness. This ensures
that the vector of changes in strategy frequencies 2 is at less than a 90° angle to the
vector of payoffs Ax. This is thus a very weak formulation of the assumption that
strategies with a high payoff grow at the expense of those with a lower return.
We can extend these dynamics to the case where profits are given by a nonlinear
function. However, we again assume that agents choose between n strategies. Th
return to each strategy given the state of the population x is T(X) = (ml,  ..., n~). Then
an agent playing any strategy y E S. would receive a payoff y . T(x).  We assume the
dynamics to be given simply by
k = Q(z)*(x). (6)
The motivation for this approach is evolutionary. In evolutionary game theory an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is defined as a strategy which is “uninvadable”.
Agents playing some alternative strategy would not be able to supplant agents who
stick to the original strategy. In the market games considered in this paper, in a
similar way, we want to know whether a given equilibrium distribution of prices can
resist any deviation by any firm or group of firms from their equilibrium strategy.
The conditions for a state @ to be an ESS are firstly, that 4 should be a best reply to
itself, that is, a Nash equilibrium, or formally,
(7)
Second, if there are any alternative best replies, any strategy x for which x . ~(#) =
~ . m(~), then ~ is better against them than they are against themselves.
d . T(x) > x . 7r(x). (8)
What this last condition implies is a kind of concavity of the payoff function. If for
example m were linear in x, and # was a fully- mixed equilibrium (#i >0 V i), (8) would
become (x – ~). Z(X – #) <0, (as (Z – ~)” m(~) = O). Now as both z and # are vectors
summing to one, (x – ~) is an element of R:, that is the space {x E Rn : ~ xi = O}.
Thus, evolutionary stability implies (in most cases) that a linear profit function, such
as for a normal form game, must be negative definite on R;. Here, with nonlinear
profit functions, what we require is that the linear approximation at the equilibrium
point be negative definite. That is, if IIZ = cZr/dx, then x . IIzx <0, V x E R;.  In
fact, such negative definiteness is a sufficient condition for dynamic stability under
positive definite dynamics.
9
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I?roposition  I An equilibrium point+ is asymptotically stable under positive definite
dynamics if IIz (~) is negative definite on R; and asymptotically unstable if IIz(q$)  is
positive definite.
This proposition is a special case of Proposition 3 which, together with its proof,
can be found in the next section, in which evolutionary market dynamics are examined
when sellers can choose from a continuum of prices.
As Burdett and Judd themselves suggested
“Examples of further possible work include stability analysis which
may give further information concerning the durability of equilibrium price
dispersion and reduce the multiplicity of equilibria in the nonsequential
model.” (1983, p967)
In this section, we do indeed carry out a stability analysis, both for fixed sample
size model of Burdett and Judd and their model of noisy sequential search. In the
former case, we will go on to analyse the dynamics the case where the two types of
agents,  firms and consumers, change their behaviour simultaneously. For the moment,
however, we consider only the behaviour of sellers, treating consumer behaviour as
fixed. We give this priority at it is likely that consumers adjust their behaviour much
more slowly than do firms. Second, the problem for consumers is largely unstrategic,
in that a consumer’s payoffs are not affected by the actions of the other consumers.
As we have seen in the simple example of Section 2, the stability of equilibrium is
largely determined by the adjustment process of the sellers.
While before we used a vector x to describe the state of the population of firms,
now its role is taken by a density function f. To simplify things somewhat in the
non-sequential case, we normalise p* to 1 and in the noisy sequential case, we similarly
normalise ~. Thus we consider distributions of prices on the interval [0,1]. As for a
dynamic on a finite dimensional space, we take a linear approximation to the nonlinear
dynamics at the equilibrium distribution and we find that, in the first case, this
equilibrium is positive definite and hence unstable. In the second, that is when
consumers search sequentially, the results are less clear cut. Howeverj  we are able to
show that there is at least one dispersed price equilibrium which is stable.
This is not the first attempt to examine evolutionary dynamics with a continuous
strategy space. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990), for example, note that, unlike in finite
dimensions, it is possible to have evolutionary stability without dynamic stability
and vice versa. We do not attempt here to obtain any general results about the
links between the two concepts. However, we have already seen that when the payoff
function is non-linear, the condition (S) for evolutionary stability is not identical
10
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to the condition for dynamic stability,
negative definite.
Let -E be a complex Hilbert space,
that is, that the linear approximation IIZ is
that is a Banach space with the addition of
f = Q(fhv (9)
where Q(f) is a continuous linear operator on E, and Xj is the profit function given
by (3). Let T = T(f) be the support off, then we assume that Q(f)  has the following
properties:
11
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Q(f)  is uniformly positive definite  elsewhere, i.e. there exists a constant m >0
such that (Q ( f )g, g) ~ m Varf (g) > 0, g @ ET( j)l, where Varf (g) is the variance
of g with respect to the distribution j: Varj(g)  = J:(g – j)2f(p)dp,  where
~ = meanf (g) = ~~ g(p).f(p)dpo
If {f.}  c Sc is a sequence of continuou~  density functions, and p is a point for
which lim~+~ f.(p) = 0, then limn+~  f.(p)  = O.
The long list of conditions should not hide the generality of the dynamics specified.
The substantive conditions are numbers 3 and 6. As noted in the previous section,
positive definiteness ensures that population shares of the different strategies grow
more or less in line with current payoffs. Property 4 ensures that f ~ dp = O and hence
Jfdp continues to be equal to one. Property 5 means that a mixed Nash equilibrium,
that is when all strategies have the same return, is an equilibrium for the dynamic.
Properties 4 and 5, together with the decomposition E = E~(j)o  @ E~(j)l,  imPIY ‘hat
Q(f) : ‘T(j)O + J%(j)O
is an isomorphism. Property 7 implies that the dynamic is invariant on S~. More
specifically, no strategy present in the initial distribution will disappear in finite time,
nor will any new strategy be created. Thus we will want to look at cases where all
prices are present in the initial distribution. This may seem somewhat restrictive, but
it should be remembered that any distribution, including those where all firms charge
the same price, can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a distribution with full
support. Second, this formulation does not prevent the limit of the dynamic process
being a state like the no-search outcome, where all sellers charge the same price.
Propert~”  2 has two important consequences. First, unlike in finite dimensions,
the spectrum of an operator on a space such as L2 may include elements which
are not eigenvalues. However, the spectrum of a compact operator consists of its
eigenvalues  alone (together with zero if the space is infinite dimensional). Second,
the Hilbert-Schmidt  theorem (see for example, Hutson and Pyre, 19S0), states that
the eigenfunctions of a compact, self-adjoint operator form an orthogonal basis for
E. since  one eigenspace of Q(f) is ET(j)l, the others span  Er(f)o.
A concrete example of such an operator is given by the replicator dynamics, which
have the form (9) with Q given by
Q(f)g = f [g - (f,dl ~f,dl (lo)
It is easily verified that the operator Q(f) satisfies the above conditions.
We begin with two preliminary general results:
Lermna 1 If Q is a compact linear operator and A is a continuous linear operator
then QA is compact. (Lang, 1993; Theorem XVII. I.2).
12
If A is a continuous operator, then it is positive definite when constrained to 13~0
if (Af, f) >0 V f E ETO and negative definite if (Af, f) <0.
Proposition 2 If A is positive (negative) definite on ETO then QA has only positive
(negative) eigenvalues  when constrained to E~o.
Proof: We have the eigenvalue  equation QAf = ~f where ~ ~ ETO . It follows
from Properties 1, 2 and 3 above, that Q : E~o -+ ETO is an isomorphism. Thus, we
can find a (unique) g ~ ETO  such that ~ = Qg.
(11)
As Q is positive self-adjoint on ETO, (Qg, g) is a positive real number. By hypothesis,
the real part of (Af,  f ) is positive (negative), hence all eigenvalues  A for eigenfunctions
of QA  in ETO  have real part positive (negative). Furthermore, from Lemma 1 , all its
spectrum is positive (negative). • 1
We can write the firms’ profits as ~f = II(f). That is, II : SC ~ E is a (non-linear)
operator mapping a distribution of prices f into a distribution of profits TJ given by
(3). It is possible to perform calculus in function spaces such as Hilbert  spaces, (see
Lang, 1993; Hutson and Pyre, 1980). In particular, the operator II is differentiable
at ~ ~ S~ if there exists a (necessarily unique) linear operator Hi : E ~ E such that
In this case, we have
Looking at the profit function (l), we can see that it is continuously differentiable
in F. If we calculate the linearisation of the profit function around the equilibrium
distribution #, we have
Profit is decreasing in the number of competitors charging a lower price. In the
fixed sample size model of Burdett  and Judd, firms’ profits are an affine  function of
the distribution of prices (q~ = O, for k > 2). Differentiation simply removes the
‘(intercept” term leaving,
(13)
13
I .
and in this case, we have
We shall assume that the operator Q defining the positive definite dynamics (9) is
differentiable (of course, this is stronger than the continuity assumption in Property
1 above). In particular, the replicator dynamic operator (10) is differentiable, with
We now consider the linearisation of the dynamics (9) in a neighbourhood of
an equilibrium ~ 6 S~. The theory of Hartman and Grobman  that a non-linear
differential equation is locally equivalent to its linear part at a hyperbolic fixed point
is valid on Banach (and hence Hilbert) spaces (Palis  and de Melo,
we write f = # + CZ, with z c Eo, in a neighbourhood  of ~, we can
non-linear equation (9) by
1982). Hence, if
approximate the
(14)
Let T = [p, 1] be the support of ~, and consider the orthogonal decomposition, E =
13T0 @ 1l~~. Thus, f G E may be written uniquely in the form f = j. + j’l, where
In particular, for z ~ Eo, we can write z = z. + Z1, with Z. E 13T0 and Z1 E J%O1 =
E. n ET1, and the local dynamics (14) decomposes into two corresponding parts.
We can now state our main results.
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Proof: For the dynamics on ET we are concerned with perturbations from equi-
librium of the form j = # + c=z,  with z ~ E~o (i.e. Z1 = O).  Now,  since ~ is an
equilibrium distribution, Q(@)r4  = O, so that T4 G KerQ(@) = E~l;  i.e. X4 is con-
stant on T. Thus, Q(~)T@ = O for any ~ ~ ET by Property 5, from which it follows
that Q~(~4,  Z) = O, and (14) simplifies to
(16)
By Proposition 2, this linearisation has only negative (positive) eigenvalues  if Hi is
negative (positive) definite. In either  case the linearisation is hyperbolic (there are
no eigenvalues  with real part zero). The solution to the linear equation (16) is given
by exp(tQII’)zO,  where Z“ is an arbitrary initial distribution of prices. (The exponent
of a linear operator tL is given by the polynomial ~~=o(tL)k/k!.  Since the normed
vector space of bounded linear operators on L2 is a Banach space, it is complete and
hence the limit of this convergent series is itself an operator on Z2.) Furthermore,
exp(-tQ(~)II’)  has the same eigenfunctions as tQ(~)II’ and eigenvalues  exp(~t).  QII’ is
compact because Q is compact and II’ is linear (Lern.ma 1). By the spectral theorem
for compact operators (Lang, 1993; Theorems XVII 3.4, 3.5), we can make a direct
sum decomposition of ET into the (generalised) eigenspaces
the finite dimensional case, all negative eigenvalues  implies
positive asymptotic instability on ET.
of QII’. Thus, just as in
asymptotic stability, all
• 1
Proposition 4 Under -the positive definite  dynamics (9), a dispersed price equilib-
rium is unstable when consumers use a fixed sample size rule.
Proof: Given an equilibrium density of prices # with support T, we consider a
perturbed distribution of prices,
Let Z(p) = ~~ z dr. Of course, Z(0) = Z(1) = O. As f is arbitrary, if the quadratic
form (H.~z,  Z) is positive then 11~ is positive definite on ETO.
Using (13),  we have
which, on integration by parts gives
Hence the linearisation (13) is positive definite and by Proposition 3 the equilibrium
is unstable on ET.• 1
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Of course, even if an equilibrium is unstable only on a subset of the total state
space, 13~ c E, it is still described as unstable. However, if we allow qk > 0 for
k >2, then the above reasoning only shows that the sign of the expression (II$z, z) is
ambiguous. Nevertheless, we can derive conditions for the linearisation to be negative
definite on ET, as follows.
From (3), the profit to firms at equilibrium is m“ = x+(l) = pql, and this is
positive provided ql >0, which we will assume. This profit must be the same for all
prices charged at equilibrium, in particular, Td(@ = T*, which gives
where ~ = ~& kqk is the mean sample  size. Clearly, O < ~ ~ 1, with ~ < 1 if
ql <1, which we will also assume. More generally, since # has support ~, I], we have
W(P)  = X* for all p G ~, 1], and (3) gives
(17)
for ~ E ~, 1]. NOW O(P) is strictly increasing from O to 1 as p increases from ~ to
1. Hence; @ : ~, 1] -+ [0, I] is an isomorphism, and we can write p = @-l(z)  for a
unique z c [0, 1].
Write  g(x) = ~& qkk(l – x) k-l, for ~ ~ [0, 1]. Then, f r o m  (1’7), P 
=  
‘
- 1( z) =
m*/pg(x).  Let T = [~, 1] and z ~ ETO. Then, from (12)
[Recall that -z ~ ~’f~ implies that z(p)= O for p G IO,pJ.] Thus
Integrating by parts and using Z(p) = Z(1) = O gives
It now follows immediately that II’ is negative definite on 13~o if and only if
(18)
(20)
We can show that there exist equilibria which satisfy (20). By Proposition 3,
such equilibria are stable on ET. However, more than this, we can also show that
they are locally asymptotically stable on the whole of S~. This involves consideration
of the local dynamics (14) for perturbations z c ET1. Such perturbations allow for
the possibility that there is a non-zero density of firms which undercut the lowest
equilibrium price p. The details will be given in Appendix 1. Thus, we can prove:
16
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proposition  5 There exist dispersed price equilibria which are locally asymptotically
stable under the positive definite  dynamics (9).
We can place an interpretation on these two results. Firstly, it is important to
realise that one consequence of (12) being negative is that it is possible to construct
deviations from equilibrium which raise the profits of all sellers (less a set of measure
zero). Imagine an alternative distribution ~ which places greater weight on high
prices: z = ~ — ~ would be negative for low prices and positive nearer 1. Assume
~ < # on the interval (~, a), f(a) = d(a),  and ~ > # on the interval (a, 1). Because,
_F < @ except at the two end points of the distribution and because profits are
decreasing in F, profits are higher everywhere. For example, in the fixed sample size
model, profits are
as F ~ @ on (~, 1). The change in profits is obviously equal to p 2q2(@ — F), and thus
is increasing in price and the difference between the two cumulative distributions.
Profits are unchanged at p = 1 as both F and @ must be equal to one at this point.
The greatest increase in profits will occur at p = (Q – F)/(2qz(f  – ~)) > a, that is,
at a point where the density of firms has increased. Just as for the simple example
of Section 2, an increase in density of firms at certain prices leads to an increase in
profits for all firms charging that price. Under positive definite dynamics, this will
result in the deviation from equilibrium increasing in magnitude, and is obviously
destabilizing. There is nothing special about this example. Since all eigenvalues  of
QH’ (when constrained to _E~O)  are positive, all deviations have a similarly destructive
effect.
Another way of writing (19) is as – Jg’(1 + q)Z2  dp, where q = (p/g’) (dg’/dp).
If we consider g’ as the marginal demand faced by the sellers, then q is the price
elasticity of that demand. In the model considered above, q = O. However, in the
case where q~ > 0 for k > 2, which may hold for equilibria under noisy sequential
search, q is negative. Because g’ remains negative, a deviation similar to the one
considered above will still raise profits for all sellers where F < ~. The important
difference is that the maximum change in profit may occur on the interval (~, a). If
indeed dg’/dp > 0, the biggest increase in profits from the deviation from equilibrium
falls to the firms that have kept their prices low. Clearly, the more price information
that consumers have, the greater is the price elasticity that sellers face. If the marginal
demand is sufficiently elastic (a sufficient though not necessary condition would be for
q < –1, a.e.), the number of firms charging low prices will grow and the distribution
of prices will return to equilibrium.
Having considered dynamics for sellers, we now examine what happens when buyers
and sellers change behaviour simultaneously in the fixed sample size case (in the model
17
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of noisy sequential search, the distribution {qk} is a parameter, and is not decided by
consumer choice, and so cannot be the subject of dynamic analysis). Unfortunately,
we have been unable to derive results in infinite dimensions for the dynamical system
representing simultaneous learning by buyers and sellers. Hence we use a discrete
approximation to the continuous distribution. Obviously though, this approximation
can be arbitrarily close to the original.
It is important to remember that the behaviour of other buyers does not enter
directly into the decision of any individual consumer. The payoff to each consumer is
determined by his decision on how much and how to search and the current distribu-
tion of prices, not by the search behaviour of other consumers. Of course, there may
be an indirect effect. For example, if average consumer search is very intense, then
there will be a downward pressure on prices, which will in turn change consumers’
expected payoffs. But it remains the case that the dynamic stability of a dispersed
equilibrium is largely determined by whether there is stability in the adjustment
process for sellers. We use this fact to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When the changes of both buyer and seller behaviour  are described
by positive definite  dynamics, the discrete approximation to the mixed equilibrium of
the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) is unstable.
Proof: In Appendix 2.
We have shown that, in the model of Burdett and Judd (1983), dispersed price equi-
libria are unstable when consumers use a fixed sample size rule. In contrast, when
a sequential search rule is used, the adjustment process for sellers may converge to
a dispersed price equilibrium. In other words, taking an evolutionary approach has
enabled us, first of all, to discriminate between different equilibria on the basis of
stability, and secondly, to discriminate between models. That is, the model where
consumers adopt a fixed sample size search rule does not possess a stable dispersed
price equilibrium. Thus, we would argue, it does not provide a good theoretical basis
for explaining the dispersion of prices, when compared with the model with noisy
sequential search.
What this paper has omitted is an investigation of how in the sequential search
case, consumers choose their reservation price. This is something for further research,
but it is worth noting the following. It is not known the way that real consumers
search, but there are reasons to believe that this search does not
a fixed reservation price rule. This is despite the fact that this
dominant paradigm in economic theory. Firstly, as Morgan and
show, the optimal search rule in many cases will take the form of a
1s
take the form of
has become the
Manning (19S5)
mixture between
a fixed sample size and a sequential rule. That is, the searcher immediately obtains
several quotations but then may take more if the offers received are unsatisfactory.
Harrison and Morgan (1990) find that behaviour under experimental conditions fits
this pattern. Second, as Telser  (1973), Rothschild (1974) and Gastwirth (1976) all
find, the optimality of a reservation price rule does not withstand the introduction
of imperfect information. If one fails to calculate the reservation price correctly, it is
possible to search for an arbitrarily long time without success. Or as Telser  puts it “if
the searcher is ignorant of the distribution, then acceptance of the first choice drawn
at random from the distribution confers a lower average cost than more sophisticated
procedures for a wide range of distributions” (1973, p45). Thus in various senses a
fixed reservation price rule does not seem robust. It is therefore unlikely that it would
form the endpoint of an adaptive process. A direction for further research would be
to see whether the evolutionary approach can pick out simple and robust search rules.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof has two stages. First, it is shown that there exists
a dispersed price equilibrium which is negative definite on its support T, and, second,
that if the system is close to this equilibrium but with full support, it approaches the
equilibrium.
For the first part, we must find a distribution, q = {q~},  for which (20) holds. TO
keep things as simple as possible, take q~ = O for k >3. Then
(21)
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.We also require qz + q~ <1 (which implies that O < ql < 1). This holds if ~z + q~ < 1;
i.e. if
But this reduces to the condition, 8q~ – 7q3 + 8>0, which holds for all real q3.
This completes the construction of a distribution (in fact, infinitely many such),
the corresponding equilibrium # is locally asymptotically stable on -ET.
It is worth noting at this stage that, if
so that condition (20) cannot possibly be
Proposition 4.
To complete the proof of Proposition
we take q~ = O for k >2, then g“(x) = O,
satisfied. This is the scenario covered by
5, we must consider perturbations from
Thus,
(’q
Hence,
Substituting into equation (22) gives
We remark that the second part of the above proof does not depend on any special
properties of the distribution q, and therefore applies to the cases considered in either
Proposition 4 or Proposition 5. This shows that the local asymptotic stability, or
instability of an equilibrium # is determined entirely by the dynamics in 11~.
( 3)2
(25)
Proof of Proposition 6. We assume that in equilibrium v < n prices are charged.
We then simply relabel these v prices, (pl, ...., pn), resetting n = V.6 The linear
approximation of the system of equations (25) at an equilibrium point S“ is given by
Q(s*)II’.  Given the consumers) payoffs (23), dC/dq is a matrix of zeros. Thus the
matrix Q(s*)II’  has the form,
Stability in the single population case depended on whether the matrix II’ was positive
(27)
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